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In a paper published recently in this journal, Dror and Scurich (2020) [20] critically discuss the notions of
“inconclusive evidence” (i.e., test items for which it is difficult to render a categorical response) and
“inconclusive decisions” (i.e., experts’ conclusions or responses) in the context of forensic science error
rate studies. They expose several ways in which the understanding and use of “inconclusives” in current
forensic science research and practice can adversely affect the outcomes of error rate studies. A main
cause of distortion, according to Dror and Scurich, is what they call “erroneous inconclusive” decisions, in
particular the lack of acknowledgment of this type of erroneous conclusion in the computation of error
rates. To overcome this complication, Dror and Scurich call for a more explicit monitoring of “in-
conclusives” using a modified error rate study design. Whilst we agree with several well-argued points
raised by the authors, we disagree with their framing of “inconclusive decisions” as potential errors. In
this paper, we argue that referring to an “inconclusive decision” as an error is a contradiction in terms,
runs counter to an analysis based on decision logic and, hence, is questionable as a concept. We also
reiterate that the very term “inconclusive decision” disregards the procedural architecture of the criminal
justice system across modern jurisdictions, especially the fact that forensic experts have no decisional
rights in the criminal process. These positions do not ignore the possibility that “inconclusives” e if used
excessively e do raise problems in forensic expert reporting, in particular limited assertiveness (or,
overcautiousness). However, these drawbacks derive from inherent limitations of experts rather than
from the seemingly erroneous nature of “inconclusives” that needs to be fixed. More fundamentally, we
argue that attempts to score “inconclusives” as errors amount to philosophical claims disguised as
forensic methodology. Specifically, these attempts interfere with the metaphysical substrate underpin-
ning empirical research. We point this out on the basis of the law of the excluded middle, i.e. the
principle of “no third possibility being given” (tertium non datur).
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).“The statement of Heraclitus, that everything is and is not, seems to
make everything true, but that of Anaxagoras, that an intermediate
exists between two contradictories, makes everything false; for
when things are blended, the blend is neither good nor not-good, so
that it is not possible to say anything truly.“
Aristotle [2, Book IV, 1012a25-29.]culty of Law, 8006, Zürich,
ermann).
er B.V. This is an open access articl1. Introduction
A key concern for legal officials who deal with expert witness
testimony is whether these witnesses can deliver on their basic
promise, i.e. to act as (proper) experts in the respective empirical
field. This raises the immediate question on what to tie an expert’s
status. Pragmatic fact-finders may find resumes a convenient
source of information, and useful as a minimum check, yet this
comes with no guarantees. In the United States, the response to this
problem has for a long time been the “general acceptance” test set
out in Frye,1 superseded (as regards the federal courts and some1 Frye v. United States 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir. 1923).
e under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
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away from the scientific community towards trial judges who are
now seen as gatekeepers of scientific validity. Interestingly, these
cases continue to echo widely even in jurisdictions in which they
have no direct applicability. Besides jurisprudence, the funda-
mental requirement of qualification and proficiency, or at least
specialised knowledge, pervades legislation,3 scholarly writing
[e.g., 13, 38] and reports by eminent commissions [e.g., 35].
Part of Daubert’s non-definitive toolkit is, among other aspects,
the “known or potential rate of error”.4 This notion of error rates has
been discussed widely and with respect to entire fields of forensic
practice, such as friction ridgemark (i.e., “fingerprint”) examination
[27]. However, since any forensic field necessarily involves the ac-
tivities of human experts, the notion of error (rate) cannot be
dissociated from empirical performance measures on the level of
individual examiners as revealed, for example, through tests con-
ducted under controlled conditions. In these contexts, various types
of studies are commonly mentioned, in particular accuracy or vali-
dation studies, but also proficiency tests, though the latter are less
amenable to generating performance characteristics that generalize
to amethod or technique as awhole. Broadly speaking, the idea here
is an empirical warrant for experts’ claims of proficiency, most
typically in the form of ametric, such as error rates [e.g., 27, 32]. The
PCAST report highlights this understanding by emphasising the
importance of so-called blackbox studies. These are studies “in
which many examiners render decisions about many independent
tests (typically, involving ‘questioned’ samples and one or more
‘known’ samples) and the error rates are determined” [35, at p.5e6].
Proficiency scores of individual examiners can, in principle, be
obtained in the same way, by having examiners keep records of
their scores and disclosing documentation of such data upon
request [11]. For example, in a recent letter to Judge Patrick Schiltz,
Chair of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence,
the U.S. Department of Justice noted:
“The Department recognizes that a forensic examiner’s past
performance on relevant, skill-based testing is an important
measure for evaluating her performance in a given case. As such,
FBI proficiency test results are routinely provided to defense
counsel upon request. The FBI Laboratory will soon begin
disclosing proficiency test results without a specific defense
request as part of their general discovery and disclosure pro-
cedures.” [17, at p.6]
At first glance, error rates seem a straightforward concept. For
example, when evaluating the performance characteristics of a
diagnostic test for a medical condition, a study is conduced on truly
diseased and truly nondiseased individuals. Similarly, in forensic
science, one can consider pairs of test items for which it is known
whether they come from the same source or not. By asking ex-
aminers to assert, for each pair of test items, whether they come
from the same source or from different sources, one could readily
keep track of the number of accurate and erroneous responses
across all examiners, but also for individual examiners. However,
the difficulties lie in the details. The analogy to the method of
establishing performance metrics in other fields, in particular
medical applications, provides some insightful analogies.2 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
3 See e.g. FRE 702 (USA) which states that a witness “is qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education”. Similarly, the Criminal Pro-
cedure Rule 19.4 (E þ W) requires that an expert’s report must “give details of the
expert’s qualifications, relevant experience and accreditation”.
4 Daubert, supra note 2, at 594.
2
Consider the example of a medical diagnostic test for detecting a
target substance, such as sperm [1]. The test items are designed in a
way such that the target substance is either present in the exam-
ined item (verifiable by a reference method), or absent. These are
the two mutually exclusive conditions. The test outcome is
dichotomous, it turns out to be either positive or negative, though
this is a simplification to which we come back in due course. How
good a test is in detecting the presence or absence of the target
substance in test items can routinely be characterised by the
following standard performance measures. The proportion of pos-
itive test results among the items that truly contain the target
substance provides the true positive rate (or, sensitivity). The pro-
portion of positive test results among the items that do not contain
the target substance informs us about the false positive rate. In
turn, the proportion of negative test results among the items that
do not contain the target substance provides the specificity of the
test.5 Note, however, that this is an idealistic view. In practice,
diagnostic test outcomes may not be univocally categorised as
either positive or negative [29], for various reasons (see, e.g.
Ref. [39], for a review).
Now compare this setup to a typical forensic identification
problem. In a forensic identification setting, there are also two
mutually exclusive and exhaustive propositions: either the exam-
ined trace (e.g., a fingermark) comes from the person of interest, or
the trace comes from an unknown person. These two possibilities
are commonly referred to as same- and different source proposi-
tions (or, specific versus unknown source propositions). Thus far,
the problem is in line with the medical test example [15, at p.568].
The analogy also holds when it comes to the result (test outcome),
i.e. examiners’ conclusions (i.e., responses): forensic scientists do
not necessarily state an identification or an exclusion. Many
forensic scientists operate on a tripartite framework including the
response “inconclusive” [e.g., 18].
This raises the question of how to properly score this type of
conclusion so as not to distort error rates. The purpose of this paper
is to analyse and discuss opposing views regarding this question.
Relevant for our discussion is a recent paper by Dror and Scurich
[20] because it critically exposes problems in the way “inconclu-
sive” decisions tend to be dealt with in current forensic science
research and practice. Dror and Scurich [20] rightly note, for
instance, that there is potential for examiners to misuse “incon-
clusive” as a response category to artificially improve their perfor-
mance (as measured by the error rate). Specifically, by conveniently
avoiding to count “inconclusives” as errors, an examiner can cook
the books by resorting to this category every time a definite ‘call’ (of
either identification or exclusion) cannot easily be made, and yet
incur no penalty in subsequent scoring. To improve the current
study designs for performance assessment, Dror and Scurich [20]
recommend a method for scoring “inconclusives”, previously pro-
posed in Ref. [16].6 Under certain conditions, this method treats
“inconclusives” as errors. While it is difficult to disagree with Dror
and Scurich [20] that current practices for processing “in-
conclusives” are unsatisfactory, and prone to adversely affect
standard procedures for computing error rates, the proposed
remedies only compound and shift the problem. We will critically
review standard terminology used in this context to illustrate this
point. Methodologically, our analysis draws on decision logic and
evidence law doctrine, mainly because forensic examiners’ con-
clusions are now widely referred to as “decisions” [15].5 See also [26] for a detailed discussion of performance metrics for medical and
psychological tests with a particular focus on applications in legal contexts.
6 Note, however, that in Ref. [16] the method was considered for a slightly
different purpose, i.e. casework only.
7 We are grateful to Professor Simon Cole for drawing our attention to this
change in terminology.
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overview of common understandings of the notion of “inconclu-
sive” as used by forensic scientists and the problem these un-
derstandings cause in error rate studies. This section also examines
arguments for and against treating “inconclusives” as potential
errors and exposes drawbacks of the modified error rate study
design proposed in Ref. [20]. Section 3 reviews the controversy over
“inconclusives” from a decision-theoretic point of view. We explain
the statements regarding the notion of error that, in a decision-
theoretic account, are and are not warranted. We also include a
doctrinal analysis that exposes the incongruence between the un-
derstanding of expert conclusions as decisions and the notion of
decisional rights in a legal perspective. Conclusions are presented
in Section 4.
2. “Inconclusive” decisions in mainstream error rate
doctrine: problems and suggested solutions
2.1. Preliminaries
To start with, it is important to note that the response category
“inconclusive” is part of a discrete, tripartite reporting vocabulary,
alongside the conclusions “(source) identification” and “(source)
exclusion” [e.g., 18]. Note, however, that regarding “inconclusives”
as a topic worthy of discussion does not mean that we recognise or
approve this reporting scheme as a suitable framework. As we will
explain in the forthcoming sections, the reasons why we do not
subscribe to this reporting framework are both methodological and
doctrinal in nature. From a legal point of view, the procedural ar-
chitecture of the criminal justice system invalidates any decisions
made by forensic experts (see Section 3.2). The arguments per-
taining to forensic science are well documented in literature [see,
e.g., 10, 14, 41] and need not be reiterated here. It suffices to note
that there now are logical methods for evaluating scientific evi-
dence and expert testimony [22]. These evaluationmethods abstain
from opining directly on competing propositions (i.e., same and
different source), and come with concepts to measure the perfor-
mance of their output [37]. Rather than on propositions, these
methods focus on the probative value of the evidence (e.g., in terms
of a likelihood ratio). The notion of “inconclusive” is also sometimes
used in this context, though only to refer to evidence that is neutral
(i.e. not probative in one way or another) and without raising
problems in the method’s performance assessment. For the time
being, however, reporting language involving the term “inconclu-
sive” e in the sense of an opinion on a proposition e is still widely
used by forensic practitioners across different forensic domains and
across jurisdictions, despite legal prohibitions and methodological
flaws. Thus, problems related to the use of “inconclusives” and
drawbacks of proposed remedies for those problems rightfully
merit attention.
2.2. The meaning of concluding “inconclusive”
The DOJ’s ULTR defines “inconclusives” as follows [18, at p.3;
emphasis added]:
‘Inconclusive’ is an examiner’s conclusion that there is insuffi-
cient quantity and/or clarity of corresponding friction ridge skin
features between two impressions such that the examiner is
unable to identify or exclude the two impressions as originating
from the same source.
The basis for an ‘inconclusive’ conclusion is an examiner’s
opinion that a ‘source identification’ or ‘source exclusion’ cannot
be made due to insufficient information in either of the two
impressions examined.3
Note the term ‘opinion’ in the second paragraph, which is a
novelty in the current version of the DOJ’s ULTR,7 as compared to
the previous version that used the term ‘decision’ [15]. Whether
treating an “inconclusive” as an opinion is more suitable than
treating it as a decision is a discussion of its own. In the next parts of
this paper, we will highlight some insights that the term “decision”
can provide, as compared to “opinion”, and explain why we
maintain that the term decision suitably captures the nature of
“inconclusives”without running into contradictions [8,9]. The basic
message conveyed by the DOJ’s ULTR, however, is clear: when
reporting “inconclusive”, one does neither identify nor exclude
[27]. While the focus of this type of statement is on ground truth,
which forensic examiners should avoid [45], the notion of “incon-
clusive” can also be used with an emphasis on the evidence (see
also Section 2.1): i.e., the statement that the observations (or,
findings) do not help to discriminate between competing propo-
sitions regarding ground truth (i.e., same or different source). For
example, OSAC’s proposed Standard for Friction Ridge Examination
Conclusions defines “inconclusive” as “the conclusion that the ob-
servations do not provide a sufficient degree of support for one
proposition over the other” [34].
These considerations refer to the information that is conveyed
when examiners use the term “inconclusive” in their reporting. It is
fair to say that this interpretation is broadly accepted throughout
forensic science. In turn, a separate and contentious issue is how
“inconclusives” should be treated, especially whether they should
be considered as errors [16]. In some sense, an “inconclusive” could
be regarded as an error because the examiner fails to assert
whether or not the compared items come from the same source.
Yet, at the same time, by not asserting one of the two ground truth
states, no misleading and hence no erroneous assertion is made.
These two viewpoints thus refer, in opposing ways, to the
congruence between the “inconclusive” conclusion issued by the
examiner and the actual ground truth.
Some discussants insist that the erroneous nature of “incon-
clusive” decisions is revealed by the consequences that these de-
cisions entail. In particular, so the argument, an “inconclusive”
decision may “neutralize” [16, at p.816] vital evidence and, thus,
deprive prosecution and defense from inculpatory and exculpatory
evidence, respectively. Conversely, “inconclusives” may also be
viewed in a more favourable light as erring on the safe side, or as an
expression of caution. Specifically, allowing examiners to make a
“pass” [27] provides them with a way to manage the potential for
false identifications and false exclusions. However, the crux of the
matter is the definition of the extent to which resorting to
“inconclusive” is acceptable, i.e. not leading to distortions.
Thus, while there are robust general arguments for and against
considering “inconclusives” as potential errors, there is a highly
sensitive area where their differential treatment has consequences
that represent a serious cause of concern. This area includes error
rate studies, a field in which the processing of “inconclusives” has
critically been discussed in a recent paper by Dror and Scurich [20].
We now turn to this paper.
2.3. How “inconclusives” can distort error rates
Studies on error rates commonly set aside “inconclusives” by not
counting them as errors on grounds that there is no agreeable way
of asserting when an “inconclusive” is to be considered an appro-
priate conclusion [e.g., 21]. Critical commentators regard this
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has the potential to distort error rates. Specifically, Dror and Scurich
note [20, at p.334e335]:
If one refuses a priori to count inconclusive decisions as errors,
then error rates may be artificially and falsely reduced by
making inconclusive decisions. In fact, zero error rates are
possible with such an approach: regardless of anything, just
reach inconclusive decisions for every comparison and you will
have a perfect score!
Strictly speaking, Dror and Scurich are right on their point, but
their critique depicts an extreme extrapolation of an abusive
reporting policy that is unlikely to be endorsed by, let alone be
useful to, examiners. Suppose that an examiner would in fact
provide, as Dror and Scurich suggest, only “inconclusives” when
being tested under controlled conditions of the conventional study
design, and thus be credited by a perfect score. This achievement
would come at a high price: the examiner would make him/her
known as someone who never provides an identification or exclu-
sion. Stated otherwise, such an examiner would be perfectly un-
helpful and run out of business. Possibly, one might prefer calling
such an expert in order to neutralize evidence that is probative in
one way or another, but this seems far-fetched. We agree, however,
that their example intends to illustrate the bias in the strategy of
overusing “inconclusive”, as any less than extreme use of “incon-
clusive” also tends to artificially decrease the error rate. An addi-
tional, realistic concern is that examiners who excessively employ
“inconclusives” in proficiency testing, to embellish their perfor-
mance, may not exhibit the same propensity towards reporting
“inconclusives” in casework, thus adding a further dimension in
which error rates can be uninformative [20].
Technically speaking, we share the above concerns about the
potential for misuse, yet a question of interest is whether the real
source of the these problems is the convention of never counting
“inconclusives” as potential errors. Where “inconclusives” are
excessively used and imply “negative consequences, such as mis-
representing error rate estimates in court which are artificially low
and inaccurate” [20, at p.335], it is legitimate to ask whether this
observation is actually the fault of the concept of “inconclusives”, or
whether it is a problem of corrupt (forensic) science in the first
place. This is a rather speculative question and its answer might be
immaterial to parties who see their evidence unduly neutralised by
an “inconclusive” decision. Yet, from a methodological point of
view, clarity on foundational principles is paramount for devising
coherent practical proceedings. The questions of whether and how
to treat “inconclusives” as potential errors are examples of ques-
tions that ask for such clarification. Answering them is important
for moving forward mainly because counting “inconclusives” as
potential errors is not without complications.
2.4. Recurrent arguments for and against treating “inconclusives”
as potential errors
As outlined in Section 2.2, it is relatively easy to find prima facie
plausible stances for and against considering “inconclusives” as
potential errors. On the one hand, since the response “inconclusive”
explicitly abstains from asserting one of the two possible ground
truths (i.e., same or different source), it cannot, by definition, be an
error. On the other hand, proponents of treating “inconclusives” as
potential errors argue that it is a failure not to make a categorical
assertion regarding ground truth where such an assertion could
have been made. For example, Dror and Scurich note: “It depends
on whether or not there is sufficient quality and quantity of infor-
mation to reach an identification or exclusion decision” [20, at4
p.335]. Invoking this, however, culminates in changing the defini-
tion of the reference point. That is, Dror and Scurich widen the
definition of error to the extent that they are able tomake a case for
scoring “inconclusives” as errors. They write: “the question is not
only about the ground truth of who left the mark, but more about
what is the correct conclusion given the information available in
the evidence” [20, at p.334]. Note that this differs from the con-
ventional definition of error that relies only on the congruence
between an examiner’s assertion and actual ground truth (see also
Section 1). However, Dror and Scurich provide no independent
argument for inflating the definition of error in the first place.
Likewise, it is not clear why the question of interest should actually
be “more about what is the correct conclusion given the informa-
tion available in the evidence” [20, at p.334; emphasis added],
rather than about ground truth.
One might object to this by arguing that the need to extend the
definition of error stems from the fact that “inconclusives” can be
used to embellish error rates. However, this places the cart before
the horse. As we have noted in Section 2.3, the mere fact that “in-
conclusives” can be misused does not imply that the fault lies on
the side of the concept of “inconclusives” and their scoring. It is
important to avoid misconstruing a perceived inconvenience in the
practical deployment of “inconclusives” as a definitional deficiency.
Likewise, no one would condemn or even give up on arithmetic in
finance simply because sometimes numbers are manipulated to
commit fraud.
Dror and Scurich invoke the practical observation that different
examiners might give different conclusions regarding the same
comparison, and that sometimes even the same examiner gives
different conclusions regarding the same comparison at different
instances of time e and that this is not only unsatisfactory, but that
this also implies that some examiners err. They note: “If some ex-
aminers conclude an identification (or exclusion) whereas other
examiners conclude an inconclusive, then at least some of the ex-
aminers are mistaken” [20, at p.334] and “it cannot be that all ex-
aminers are correct when they reach different conclusions on the
same evidence” [19, at p.704; emphasis as in original]. To be clear, if
one takes ground truth as the reference point (here: same or
different source), then categorical expert assertions of identifica-
tion and exclusion that do not correspond to ground truth, are er-
rors. In this sense only either identification or exclusion is a correct
answer. However, concluding from this that examiners who report
“inconclusive” while others identify or exclude are in error, is not
straightforward. What the empirical observation of some exam-
iners reporting “inconclusive” means is that, first of all, some ex-
aminers are less assertive than others. But scoring the less assertive
expert as erroneous would require one to assume that there can
only be one correct answer. This is an assumption for which Dror
and Scurich provide no independent justification. Instead, their
position is axiomatic in that it refers back to their extended defi-
nition of error given above, predicated on the idea of there being a
(single) “correct conclusion given the information available in the
evidence” [20, at p.334].
Let us pause here for a moment to clarify what this shifting
definition of error implies. An immediate consequence is that the
criterion for determining whether a given conclusion is an error is
no longer based on ground truth (which can be easily controlled for
in experimental settings). Instead, the determination will be based
on an explicitly ground truth-independent status of what ought to
be “the correct conclusion given the information available in the
evidence” [20, at p.334]. This implies nothing less than defining
category labels based on human judgment (either as a consensus or
majority vote [20]) regarding perceivable features of the evidence
(“quality and quantity of information” [20, at p.335]) other than
ground truth. Let us recall that ground truth in the traditional sense
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propositions salient in a given experiment: e.g. the compared items
either come or do not come from the same source. Defining errors
with respect to such real states of nature enshrines the notion of
factual accuracy which, by the way, pervades the legal system,
including determinations such as legal verdicts. Dror and Scurich’s
view, however, conflates the ontological level of analysis (where
ground truth is fixed) with the epistemic level of analysis (where
ground truth remains uncertain). Thus, they conflate the perfor-
mance characteristics of a test or method (i.e., sensitivity and
specificity) with the epistemic features of expert witness testimony.
This is equivalent to arguing for a third, intermediate stage of
pregnancy, treating this condition as a non-binary, as a result of an
imperfect pregnancy test. But, we cannot change the meaning of
words and their possible ontological states due to inherently
imperfect measuring instruments, and we cannot allow uncer-
tainty to escape the epistemic domain and infiltrate the ontological
domain. As an aside, it is interesting to note that diagnostic accu-
racy studies in medical literature also consider only two ground-
truth states (the so-called “target condition” [12]) and three
response categories, leading to the well-known 3  2 tables
[23,40].8
For forensic purposes, ground truth in controlled experiments
(e.g., validation studies or proficiency tests) can, in principle, un-
equivocally be established.9 In turn, Dror and Scurich suggest that
this reference point should be replaced by category labels estab-
lished exclusively by some sort of inherently unequivocal forensic
wisdom that takes the form of either a Fryeesque-consensus among
independent experts, or a majority vote. This manages to miss the
basic lesson from Daubert: consensus in the respective community
is simply a surface feature of established and robust protocols and
methods, not their core feature. Methods are not sound when or
because experts agree on them. On the contrary, there is scientific
consensus when these methods exhibit particular levels of per-
formance. Arguing otherwise confuses cause and effect by reducing
scientific status and reliability to consensus or decision-making
rules (e.g. majority vote) rather than to methodological features.
In practice, Dror and Scurich’s framework tends to encourage
individual experts to no longer think in terms of whether their
conclusion in the instant case aligns with actual ground truth.
Instead, they are directed towards thinking about an artificial
category label that expresses a ‘forensically correct’ determination
(given the quality and quantity of available information) that, at
best, they can only divine. It encourages group-thinking rather than
rigorous, self-critical assessment in the light of the individual ex-
pert’s actual knowledge and proficiency. This perspective goes
fundamentally against recent developments in forensic science
[e.g., 22] that precisely aim at moving away from depicting forensic
science proficiency as a mystic skill that only a restricted circle of
initiated individuals possess.
What is more, as already noted by Weller and Morris [44], Dror
and Scurich’s extended account of the notion of error can lead to
the paradoxical situation in which examiners who render factually
correct conclusions (in the traditional sense of congruence with
ground truth), such as an identification, would be considered to be
wrong when the consensus or majority opinion is that the conclu-
sion should be “inconclusive”. Rather astonishingly, Dror and
Scurich respond to this paradox by doubling down on their view8 Medical literature also mentions the use of 2  3 tables, but in contexts where
the reference method (or, standard) cannot determine the ground truth state (i.e.,
disease status) of a patient [31]. This is not a concern in forensic science.
9 Note that this is an advantage over some medical applications that need to
establish a target condition using a reference method or a standard.
5
according to which “it is irrelevantwhether that determination [i.e.
an individual examiner’s conclusion] was ‘factually correct’ because
the issue is about whether there is a justified basis for drawing the
conclusion” [19, at p.703; emphasis added]. Clearly, Dror and
Scurich’s merely restate their extended definition of error outlined
above, which offers no answer to Weller and Morris’ valid point.
One does not solve the paradox of labelling factually correct con-
clusions as errors by maintaining that factual accuracy is unim-
portant (“irrelevant”). Dismissing ground truth as irrelevant is an
(almost postmodernist) opinion, not an argument. It is an opinion
because it offers no reason why we should use expert judgment as
the reference point in controlled studies whenwe can actually have
ground truth. Thus far, it seems, discussants are talking past each
other. We will further dissect this impasse in the next section.
2.5. The consequences of giving up ground truth as the reference
point
At first sight, Dror and Scurich’s extensive account of the notion
of error provides a way to overcome an inconvenience associated
with the treatment of “inconclusives” in the conventional error
(rate) paradigm anchored on ground truth. The inconvenience,
here, is the distortion of error rates. This is a legitimate concern and
it is a laudable goal to seek ways to remedy the current situation.
However, this does not exempt us from assessing the extent to
which their suggested corrective implies new problems that,
overall, would undermine the improvement they seek to achieve.
As we have seen in the previous section, a key element of their
account is an extended definition of error that allows theme under
certain circumstances e to score “inconclusives” as errors. This
extended definition, we remind, sets forth category labels decided
by consensus of independent experts or majority votes by study
participants as the relevant reference point against which indi-
vidual examiners’ conclusions are to be compared. This results in
giving up on the very notion of ground truth as the relevant
reference point. We shall now take a closer look at what this
practically means.
First and foremost, Dror and Scurich’s account requires one to
assign a label to each comparison (i.e., a pair of test items) in an
experiment under controlled conditions (i.e., error rate study). That
label e to paraphrase Dror and Scurich e is not the ground truth
label, but the justifiable conclusion given the quantity and quality of
information available in the evidence. Take, as an example, a pair of
test items that come from the same source: in Dror and Scurich’s
account, the category label for this comparison is not determined
on the basis of ground truth (i.e., same source), but on whether
there is sufficient retrievable quality and quantity of information in
the evidence to justifiably assert “same source” (i.e., identification).
That is, the comparisonwould be labelled “same source” (i.e., source
identification) only if there is sufficient quality and quantity of in-
formation in the evidence. The question thus is how one is to
determine such category assignments.
In all fairness, Dror and Scurich acknowledge that this is not
straightforward. They note: “as a practical matter, determining
which evidence falls within this category is complicated” [20, at
p.335] and “determining whether evidence does e or does not e
have sufficient quality and quantity of information is challenging”
[19, at p.703]. Notwithstanding, they “propose two different prac-
tical and feasible ways” [20, at p.335] to assign category labels:
consensus determinations by independent expert panels and ma-
jority votes by study participants. Besides discussions on how
exactly to implement these proposals, on which there may be
divergent views, these proposals seem pragmatic. However, prag-
matism is not a sufficient criterion for judging adequacy for use in
practice. It is at least equally important to ensure conceptual
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two problems that go to the heart of the nature and the logic of
forensic inference of source.
The first problem has to do with the assumption that evidence,
in virtue of its quality and quantity, predicates a conclusion for a
given comparison. In the light of the currently best available un-
derstanding of the nature and the logic of forensic inference of
source, this is simply not the case. The point has been made
repeatedly, for a number of decades [41,42], and it can be recon-
structed using various formal developments [e.g., 4, 5, 6]. Simply
put, these developments show that evidence can, at best, be
informative with respect to competing propositions regarding
ground truth. But evidence cannot logically predicate a conclusion,
whether it is a conclusion in the sense of a traditional ground truth
label, or the assignment of a category label in Dror and Scurich’s
scheme. In other words, making a defensible conclusion in the
conventional identification paradigm of “identification e exclusion
e inconclusive” requires more than the data one has, and more
than the hypothesis one believes to be true: it requires a value
judgment [42]. Note that this is merely one among many reasons
for the observable move away from the aforementioned identifi-
cation paradigm. But, as mentioned at the beginning of this paper
(Section 2.1), as long as there is still a widespread use of this
scheme, it remains important to expose its shortcomings and those
of concepts, such as Dror and Scurich’s account, that build on it.
The second problem pertains to the assumption that a given
comparison can only have one admissible conclusion. To be clear,
we do not contest the logical proposition that the compared items
either come or do not come from the same source. To assert this is
tautological, for only one of the two ground truths can be true. But
this does not imply that a given comparison necessarily has only
one associated conclusion of either “identification”, “exclusion” or
“inconclusive”. Arguing otherwise would mean to confuse item
category labels with response categories, which is equivalent to
conflating possible states of the world with (probabilistic) state-
ments about the world. Again, there are multiple reasons for
making this distinction, and we are only briefly going to mention a
few of them. Firstly, for a given comparison, the perceived quality
and quantity of information e the so-called findings or observa-
tions e inevitably vary between examiners, as a function of their
(background) knowledge, experience, and proficiency. Secondly,
even for a fixed finding or observation, there is not a single pro-
bative value to be assigned. For example, in the field of friction ridge
(i.e., fingermark/-print) examination, a variety of (probabilistic)
models exist, relying upon different sources of data [e.g., 33, 43],
and this can lead to differences in output. Third, even if therewere a
single (or agreed) probative value for a given piece of evidence (or
configuration of features), this would still not entail that there is
only one possible conclusion (i.e., examiner’s response) simply
because the various necessary ingredients (e.g., utilities/losses,
prior information) for deciding logically upon a conclusion may
assume different configurations. This precludes a univocal e
let alone prescriptive e conclusion. Finally, even if scientists
endeavoured to instantiate all the necessary logical ingredients for
deciding upon a conclusion, they would find themselves in a
stalemate insofar as some of the components, especially value
judgments, go beyond the scope of their expertise. Thus, persisting
in their endeavour would come at the price of becoming unscien-
tific [41,42].
In view of these observations, we cannot subscribe to Dror and
Scurich’s assertion that “establishing that inconclusive decisions
can be errors is theoretically and conceptually justified and clear”
[20, at p. 335]. For the same reasons, we can also not subscribe to
Dror and Scurich’s contention that “if some examiners conclude an
identification (or exclusion) whereas other examiners conclude an6
inconclusive, then at least some of the examiners aremistaken” [20,
at p.334].
2.6. A closer look at a proposal for scoring “inconclusives” for the
purpose of error rate studies
Dror and Scurich call the traditional, reality-based error rate
study design “misleading” [20, at p.335]. Inwhat they refer to as the
“suggested and correct study design” [20, at p.335], they propose to
replace the two ground truth labels “same source” and “different
source” by three category labels. These do not reflect mutually
exclusive and exhaustive states of the world (ground truth), but the
ascertainable conclusions “same source”, “different source” and
“inconclusive”, which are epistemic in nature. As explained in the
previous sections, these states are the justifiable conclusions, to be
determined either through a consensus or a majority vote. Pro-
ceeding in this way, so the idea, one can score an “inconclusive”
decision as erroneous whenever the test items at hand are labelled
either as ascertainable “same source” or “different source”. Provided
that one can sort out and agree on a way to ascertain the category
label for each test pair, this modified testing regime seems to offer a
pragmatic way to score “inconclusives” as potential errors. Yet,
there are further problems that add to the difficulties we have
exposed so far. The problems have both a terminological and con-
ceptual side, and pertain to the categories and their labels.
In Dror and Scurich’s nomenclature, the category labels are
referred to as what “the evidence is” [20, at p.335] in the view of
human experts: i.e., an asserted evidential type. In their scheme,
there are test items declared as same source evidence, different
source evidence and “inconclusive” evidence, each representing a
category label. This is terminologically confusing because category
labels denote an actual property of test items, not an asserted
evidential type. The actual problem is the other way round: evi-
dence is the starting point, it is what needs to be assessed in the
process of inference and decision-making about category mem-
bership (here: ground truth). Of course, it is possible to deliberately
make up categories based on observable features, which is a com-
mon procedure in taxonomy (or, classification). However, this
cannot serve as an analogy because inference of source is not tax-
onomy e in the same way that an arrow is not a destination.
In view of the above analysis, let us now take a closer look at the
category (label) “inconclusive”. It is important to remember that
asserted “inconclusives” necessarily are e in terms of ground truth
e either same or different source test items, regardless of whatever
other labels they have been assigned. Hence, “inconclusiveness”, in
this sense, does not represent a ground truth state, in the sameway
that being unsure about how to get to London does not mean that
London’s existence is uncertain. This is not a rhetorically empty
shell. Dror and Scurich give up on the law of excluded middle [3],
i.e. on the metaphysical substrate of scientific research, only
because sometimes “determining which evidence falls within [a]
category is complicated” [20, p.335].
For the purposes of comparison, consider a medical test
designed to detect a medical condition or the presence of a target
substance in a test item. Clearly, the medical condition or target
substance is either present or absent [12], it is not “ascertainably
present/absent”. This is not meant to ignore the practical reality
that test items may be challenging and difficult to assess. For
example, forensic scientists may choose to work with test items
called “close non-matches” [28]. Such test items share similarities,
but they are known to come from different sources. Hence, the
ground truth state remains key to defining the categories to which
the test items belong.
The reasonwhy we insist on these terminological distinctions is
that they have far-reaching conceptual implications that merit
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suggested by Dror and Scurich amounts to (reverse) engineer rules
so as to accommodate the starting assumption that “inconclusives”
are potential errors. As noted above, this differs from the traditional
study design that takes the measurement of diagnosticity as the
starting point, and encounters the question of how to score “in-
conclusives” only as a subsequent, collateral complication.
Notwithstanding, let us suppose for a moment that we adopted
Dror and Scurich’s conceptual scheme. Would this mean that the
problem of scoring “inconclusives” has successfully been solved,
and hence that the traditional and allegedly deficient error rate
study designs have been fixed? The answer is: No. In fact, the
contrary is the case because the error rates resulting from this
modified study design no longer reflect the understanding of error
of the conventional study design. The error rates in the modified
study design become self-referential since they no longer refer to
features of the target system.
To understand why this is so, it is again useful to recall the
general (medical) testing design and ask what exactly is to be
assessed by such testing. Clearly, the focus is on the diagnostic ca-
pacity of a test. That is, it is of interest to evaluate the performance
of a test (or testing device) to provide us with information about
ground truth. We are not interested in the test’s capacity to tell us
something about an artificial categorisation that may or may not be
congruent with ground truth. Crucially, we cannot measure the
test’s diagnostic capacity when the true state of the target system is
not known.10 Similarly, in forensic science, the problem encoun-
tered and to be solved by recipients of expert information is
whether the test items come from the same or from different
sources (i.e., ground truth). Here, “inconclusive” does clearly not
reflect a contested state of affairs e instead, it is a response cate-
gory. Stated otherwise, when an expert is adduced to help with
discriminating between the contested versions defended by parties
at trial, the expert’s diagnostic capacity needs to properly refer to
ground truth e because this is what end-users of expert informa-
tion are interested in e regardless of the chosen reporting format,
i.e. the tripartite classic response scheme or an expression of the
probative value of the evidence. This means that one needs infor-
mation about the expert’s performance in “detecting” ground truth,
not an artificial categorisation of the kind supposed in Dror and
Scurich’s modified study design.
To reinforce the above point on the necessity of ground truth as
a reference point, consider what is typically themain concern in the
instant case: the concern is not any type of error, but e most
importantly e whether the expert has ever reported “identifica-
tion” decisions when in reality the test items came from different
sources. This calls for genuine false positives anchored on ground
truth. This can, first of all, be elicited as a raw count (though, as
further elaborated below, not in isolation), thus avoiding any hassle
over the concept of rates and the multiple types of errors that their
various definitions may aggregate. Indeed, it would be shortsighted
to dismiss genuine false positives as determined by the conven-
tional study design simply because of disagreements over how to
compute an error rate. What is more, regardless of the outcome of
the controversy over the “correct” way to compute error rates,
eliciting genuine false positives and spending efforts on scrutinis-
ing such data might turn out to be more fruitful than fighting a
battle over how to compute error rates that, by definition, are
typically uninformative about the instant case. The following ex-
amples illustrate the host of insights that may be drawn from
inspecting genuine false positive counts: when and how errors10 We leave aside here various ways to “establish” ground truth by proxy, such as
standards or reference methods.
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have been made (e.g., how they distribute over time; periodically
and/or in clusters; do they increase/decrease), under what kinds of
circumstances (e.g., training, regular proficiency testing, close non-
match studies [28], casework), the number and type of controlled
studies completed by the expert, etc. Similar investigations can be
undertaken for “inconclusives”, in order to learn more about the
conditions under which they have been provided.
It is worth noting that themedical literature on the design of and
reporting on diagnostic accuracy studies is broadly in line with this
perspective. For example, regarding “inconclusives” (also some-
times called “indeterminate”or “intermediate” results [e.g., 29]), it is
consideredgoodpractice to report theoccurrence (frequency) of this
type of response, and the circumstances under which this type of
response was encountered. These data provide an indication of the
feasibility of a test which, in turn, informs about practical useful-
ness.11 As strategies to summarise study results, medical literature
commonly invokes two statistics, amongothers. One is the so-called
test yield [40]. This is the percentage of all test results used for
calculating the conventional (i.e. binary) summary statistics. The
lower this percentage, the more “inconclusive” results were recor-
ded in the study. Another figure is the so-called “effectiveness” [36].
This is the proportion of correct responses among the total number
of responses (including “inconclusives”). Note, however, that test
yield and effectiveness are additional statistics for characterising a
given test as a whole, different from the sensitivity and specificity.
Turning back to the forensic science context, consider one last
important consequence of digressing from the traditional study
design based on ground truth. Recall that in Dror and Scurich’s
modified error rate study design, the conclusion “identification” for
test items from the same source labelled as “inconclusive” is
counted as an error. We do not contest that this has the merit of
penalising reckless or overconfident “identification” responses. But
we need to recognise that this comes at the price of penalising the
truly competent and outperforming examiners in cases where they
correctly identify (in terms of correspondence with ground truth)
despite the fact that the consensus or majority vote is that the test
items are “inconclusive”. This means to a priori exclude dissent
without even considering the possibility that these conclusions
could have a defensible basis (e.g., in terms of the distinct config-
uration of recorded features and the probative value assigned to
those features).
As noted earlier, such a testing regime would set false in-
centives: it would direct examiners towards divining what the
mythical forensic wisdom of the consensus opinion might be (and
hence enshrine the false belief in the existence of such wisdom),
rather than ground truth. To the extent that consensus andmajority
votes imply a ceiling towards an average, the modified study design
thus discourages excellence and penalises genuinely out-
performing examiners. None of these incentives appear helpful for
the way forward of forensic science.
What is more, the two proposed options to determine category
labels in the modified study design, i.e. a panel of experts and the
majority vote from study participants, have opinionism as a com-
mon denominator. According to this proposal, thus, the remedy for
allegedly deficient ways to deal with “inconclusives” are panels of
experts looking for points of general acceptance. But this would
bring us back to the notion of “general acceptance”, i.e. the test
introduced by Frye and abolished by Daubert (see Section 1). Thus,
reducing the scientific character of practitioners’ contentions to
“general acceptance” amounts to masquerading, and reenacting the
Frye-test as a forensic method without having to argue for it.11 This connects back to our argument in Section 2.3 according to which exam-
iners are less helpful, the more often they report “inconclusive”.
A. Biedermann and K.N. Kotsoglou Forensic Science International: Synergy 3 (2021) 1001473. The problems of understanding expert conclusions as
decisions
The mainstream controversy over how to score “inconclusive
decisions”, as we see it, is largely motivated by possible distortions
in traditional error rate determinations, rather than derived from a
rigorous conceptualisation of the problem in the first place (i.e.,
diagnosticity). Clearly, the quality of error rates is a valid concern,
but the conceptual soundness of any proposed remedy is equally
important. It is at this point that an even deeper problem looms. It
relates to the decisional nature of “inconclusives” and widely es-
capes current debates over how to understand “inconclusives”. In
this section, we provide a brief sketch of the problem on two levels
of analysis: the understanding of conclusions in decision-analytic
terms (Section 3.1), and the notion of decisional rights in a legal
perspective (Section 3.2).3.1. The misconceived decisional nature of expert conclusions
It has become fashionable in forensic science to refer to exam-
iners’ responses (and conclusions) as decisions, but the field has
struggled to use this term properly, not only in terms of under-
standing the conceptual implications of treating conclusions as
decisions, but also in terms of aligning its practice accordingly
[14,15]. The consequence of this are unwarranted and contradictory
treatments of “inconclusives”.
Start by taking a look at a commonly evoked line of argument:
suppose an examiner concludes (or reports) “identification” when
in fact the compared (test) items come from the same source. Here,
“identification” is the decision and “same source” is the true state of
nature. By definition, the combination of a decision and a state of
nature leads to a decision consequence (or outcome). Here, the
decision consequence is an accurate identification and is commonly
called a good12 outcome. It is also commonly said that the examiner
made a good, right or correct decision. But does this really make
sense? A decision-theoretic perspective reveals several confusions:
 First, the accuracy of outcomes is not equivalent to their value,
i.e. (un-)desirability. Saying that a decision outcome is accurate
is merely a descriptive statement that refers to the congruence
with respect to ground truth. To make a statement about the
“goodness”, attractiveness or desirability of a decision conse-
quence, one needs to express its value on a particular scale.
Stated otherwise, we need to distinguish between what a de-
cision consequence is, descriptively, from what this conse-
quence represents to us in terms of value. In decision theory, the
value of decision consequences is specified in terms of utilities
or losses.
 Second, and more fundamentally, the value of a decision
consequence must not be confused with the merit, value or
“goodness” [7] of a decision. Simply put, and contrary to usage in
informal conversation, the mere fact that a decision led to a
desirable (or, good) outcome does not mean that a good decision
was made [25]. It suffices to imagine a situation in which a
consequence of high desirability had a small probability of
occurrence, while the alternative decision consequence e with
high probability e would have represented a profoundly un-
desirable result. Thus, the “goodness” of decisions cannot be
equated with the values assigned to decision consequences.
Instead, decision theory tells us, the criterion for scoring12 We use here the term “good” informally as a synonym for “desirable”. A more
formal treatment of the notion of desirability uses the concept of utility.
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decisions is a function of the value of decision consequences
paired with their respective probabilities of occurrence [e.g., 24,
30].
 Third, the consequence of a decision, and hence its value, is
known13 e though not always e only after a decision is made.
Thus, rating decisions post hoc based on their outcomes is
shallow: nothing is to be learned about the quality of a decision
by inspecting its outcome [24]. The real problem, from the
viewpoint of examiners, is ex ante: they need a way to score and
compare decisions without being able to know how the de-
cisions will turn out [7]. The philosopher Wittgenstein has
spelled this insight out: “If therewere a verbmeaning ‘to believe
falsely’ it would not have a meaningful first person present
indicative.” [46] It is not very helpful, therefore, to assess de-
cisions against metaphysical concepts such as ground truths. But
we need the latter for the very term true and false to make
sense. This brings us back to the previous point onworking out a
measure for the merit of a decision based on value judgments
for decision consequences and associated uncertainties. In this
sense, then, a good decision is one that is made logically,
acknowledging the alternatives from which to choose, the de-
cision maker’s preferences among decision consequences and
the uncertainties about the real states of the world, assessed
coherently in the light of inevitably imperfect data at our
disposal.
The above concepts allow us to critically review the controversy
over the treatment of “inconclusive” decisions both in general, but
also in error rate studies, and to substantiate the arguments we
have presented throughout this paper. We can consider the
following three main points.
First, to ensure conceptual rigour, it is necessary to distinguish
between “inconclusive” as a decision and the consequence of
deciding “inconclusive” when the compared (test) items come or
do not come from the same source. In particular, features of the
latter, decision outcomes, cannot directly be carried over to state-
ments about the quality of decisions. Thus, studies under controlled
conditions (i.e., with known ground truth) primarily deal with
scoring decision consequences, not decisions themselves.
Second, to answer the question of howa consequence of deciding
“inconclusive” compares to the consequences of the rival decisions
“identification” or “exclusion”, which amounts to an expression of
our preferences, we need to express the desirability of outcomes on
an agreed scale (e.g., utilities or losses) that applies equally to the
consequences of all decisions (i.e., the space of decisions containing
the elements “identification”, “exclusion” and “inconclusive”).
Thus, attempting to label the consequences of “inconclusive” de-
cisions as correct (accurate) or incorrect (erroneous) is a contra-
diction in terms when accuracy denotes congruence with ground
truth. “Inconclusives” explicitly make no statement about ground
truth. At best, wemay express the value that the consequence of an
“inconclusive” decision represents to us, but the descriptive vo-
cabulary of “error” is unsuitable for this. Instead, as noted above, a
measure of the value of a decision consequence is needed. Pursuing
this in a full decision-theoretic analysis is beyond the scope of this
paper. We solely note that such an analysis demonstrates that the
consequences of “inconclusive” decisions actually have a high
utility, as long as one is averse to false positives [8]. Hence, a
negative view on the consequences of “inconclusive” decisions by13 In proficiency testing, where ground truth is known for each pair of test items,
the accuracy of outcomes can be known. This is different for casework, and legal
decision-making in general, where ground truth is, in principle, not known and
remains unknown.
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attempts to score “inconclusives” as errors.
Third, and related to the previous point, given that the conse-
quence of an “inconclusive” decision may enjoy a high utility, an
“inconclusive” decision may, in turn, be a viable competitor to
“identification” and “exclusion” decisions. Hence, it is as much
unwarranted to consider the consequences of “inconclusive” de-
cisions as inadequate by default as it is unwarranted to consider
“inconclusive” decisions as unsuitable by default.
3.2. Decisional rights
The multiple conceptual problems that affect attempts to model
expert conclusions as decisions, exposed throughout the previous
sections, should be reason enough to recognise the missing foun-
dations for decision-making by experts. Yet, as we have mentioned
in Section 2.1, we are aware that current forensic practice widely
persists in their conventional reporting schemes. This is all the
more surprising in that the reporting scheme also conflicts with
legal principles, in particular with decisional rights. It is of value,
thus, to briefly address this point through elements of a doctrinal
analysis. It reveals the controversy over how to score “in-
conclusives” and the tripartite classic response categories as
misguided, which should prevent us from using these notions in
the first place.
To clarify the legal standpoint, we first need to revisit principles
in the law of evidence, or at least the common doctrinal denomi-
nator that underpins the law of evidence in common law juris-
dictions.14 The need for interpretation of forensic evidence invokes
a fundamental feature of the law of evidence, i.e. the opinion rule.15
According to traditional evidence law doctrine, experts will present
fact-finders with physical rules or general principles and help them
apply the domain-specific general knowledge to the evidence
introduced in the respective case. The term ‘help’ is bearing here
much of the conceptual burden e in multiple ways. The expert
witness is bound to testify only within his or her area of expertise;
any step outside that strictly circumscribed area constitutes a
procedurally forbidden invasion of the fact-finder’s province.16
Lawton LJ’s enduring dictum in Turner, which predicates admissi-
bility on necessity, sets the tone in this area of English law: “If on
the proven facts a judge or jury can form their own conclusions
without help, then the opinion of an expert is unnecessary”.17 It is,
thus, the jury that has the decision-making prerogative and any
usurpation thereof is procedurally barred and, as we have noted
previously (Section 2.5), scientifically unwarranted.
Within the exclusionary scope of the opinion rule fall expert
witnesses who express unsolicited opinions, speculate or make
value judgments about the facts of the case. This includes source
attribution determinations (SADs) that pre-empt the decisions of
the fact-finder. Only jurors or triers of fact more generally are
democratically legitimised and procedurally authorised to make
judgments under uncertainty, resolving thus factual disputes about
unique historical events. Usurping the territory of triers of fact by
taking over decisional rights which forensic experts do not have,
nor should have, triggers the odd jurisprudential reprimand. As the14 Any reference to the common law of evidence is, to a certain extent, an over-
simplification, but acceptable for the purposes of this paper. Our account here
covers mainly the law of evidence in England and Wales.
15 Already since the late 18th century, the common law has erected a general ban
on opinion evidence in order to entrench the decision-making prerogative of the
fact-finder. The early leading case is Folkes v Chadd (1782) 3 Doug K.B. 157. See Robb
(1991) 93 Cr. App. R. 161 CA (E þ W).
16 R v. Davies [1962] 3 All E.R. 97.
17 Turner [1975] Q.B. 834 at 841 CA.
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Court of Appeal (England and Wales) reiterated in Brennan18 “in
criminal trials cases are decided by juries, not by experts”. Making
decisions about ultimate issues, including intermediate issues such
as SADs, which require value judgments, is not part of forensic
practitioners’ duties.
The normative structure of the criminal process should not be
ignored as it may help prevent dubious, indeed nonsensical results
in forensic science practice. It is important to realise that the
criminal process is not a ritual with a recurrent and foreseeable
outcome. Criminal processes have open outcomes. On the flipside,
criminal process officials do not make the rules as they go along.
Legal adjudication, especially in the criminal context, is not an
anything-goes activity. The defendant has a default status e pre-
sumed innocence e which he shall retain unless and until his guilt
has been proven to the requisite standard of proof. In that sense,
there can be no such thing as an “inconclusive decision” in the
criminal process.
One might think that the “decisions” which are widely referred
to in discussions surrounding the reporting practice of forensic
scientists are of a different type. That is, so the argument, the sci-
entist’s decisions (i.e., reported conclusion) do not directly affect
the defendant/suspect’s status; instead, these decisions refer only
to the source of the forensic trace item and, more specifically, to the
question of whether it comes from the same source as the reference
item, or from a different source. This line of defence, however, is
weak in view of the doctrinal framework that validates and restricts
the operations of forensic practitioners. In this sense, there is no
such notion as “inconclusive decisions” e forensic scientists do not
decide anything and they certainly do not, indeed cannot provide
SADs. Expert witnesses and, more generally, forensic practitioners
lack the necessary decisional rights.4. Conclusions
In all, our analysis does not leave much intact from recent at-
tempts to label “inconclusives” as errors. To be clear, we do not
argue that we should not focus on errors or error rates. Quite the
contrary: our point is that recording errors is important, but errors
of the suitable kind, and task-specific information regarding such
errors. By this we mean genuine errors determined with respect to
ground truth, rather than with respect to artificial category labels
which lack a coherent conceptual basis and, thereby, lead to para-
doxes in practice (e.g., penalising factually correct responses).
Similarly, arguing against the scoring of “inconclusives” as po-
tential errors does not mean to dismiss the focus on “inconclusive”
decisions. They are an important category of decisions precisely
because they allow “identifications” and “exclusions” to be used
only when stringent requisite conditions are satisfied, not least
because we value adverse outcomes of decisions such as “identifi-
cation”, i.e. false positives, as highly undesirable. This assertion is
not based on mere intuition, but can be demonstrated through a
decision-theoretic analysis [8].
It is also important, of course, to monitor the extent to which
examiners give “inconclusives”. Clearly, the excessive use of “in-
conclusives” is self-defeating, thus questioning the need to resort to
a conceptually flawed scoring scheme to expose the allegedly
erroneous nature of “inconclusives”. The proportion of “in-
conclusives” among the total number of responses is a simple
descriptive measure that provides an indication of the respon-
siveness, or assertiveness, of an examiner, but inquiries should not
stop there. It is equally important to consider the number of18 R v. Brennan [2015] 1 WLR 2060, [2014] EWCA Crim 2387, [43].
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conditions. It makes a difference, for example, whether an exam-
iner performed comparisons in a reputedly easy proficiency test, or
whether the test items were close non-matches. What these con-
siderations show is that the problem of expert proficiency is in
many ways more subtle than what a summary in terms of a crude
statistic, such as a rate, could provide. Thus, instead of dismissing
the traditional diagnostic performance assessment matrix (rooted
in ground truth) in a confusing debate over how to summarise test
responses, it seemsmore worthwhile to deploy efforts to clarify the
nature of the problem of diagnostic capacity in the first place, and
to scrutinise task-specific data regarding the conditions under
which genuine errors have been committed. This should prove
insightful for both recipients of expert information and experts
themselves. Similar viewpoints can be found in the vast medical
literature on diagnostic accuracy studies [e.g., 12, 29, 39].
Besides these practical conclusions, attempts to frame “in-
conclusives” as potential errors also suffer from conceptual prob-
lems. In particular, giving up on ground truth by introducing an
extended, tripartite classification scheme, interferes with the
metaphysical substrate that underpins meaningful scientific
research. The very idea of empirical research presupposes the
intelligibility of mutually exclusive and exhaustive propositions.
Whatever our degree of belief is, a forensic item or trace either has
or does not have a given person of interest as its source: Tertium not
datur (“no third possibility being given”) e Aristotle’s principle of
the excluded middle [3]. Erecting “inconclusive” to a classification
category thus means to chase philosophical shadows. It amounts to
confusing binary philosophical concepts (correspondence to the
true facts as our metaphysical substrate) with questions that are
epistemic and multivalued in nature. Rejecting the argumentative
implications of the excluded middle means to break with millennia
of philosophical tradition, and to get trapped unknowingly inside a
philosophical “bottle”. Our aim should be, in Wittgenstein’s words,
to “show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle” [46, para.309].
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